We also look at the government’s mandate for the use of inline eXtensible Business Reporting Language (iXBRL) for all accounts filed from 1 April 2028; what it means for preparers, how it fits with MCR and gaps in assurance.
Links
- Binance hack reveals crypto’s uphill battle against attackers (Reuters)
- Fake job interviews used as part of Binance hack
- Kodex
- ICAEW: UK government pauses profit and loss filing but sticks with software-only filing
- ICAEW: MCR - the big questions
- ICAEW CPD record
Host
Philippa Lamb
Guests
- Adrian Morris, Associate Director, Digital Asset Recovery Team, Grant Thornton
- Michalis Georgiou, Senior product & market specialist, CoreFiling Limited
Producer
Natalie Chisholm
Series Lead
Mark Rowland
Transcript:
Philippa Lamb: Today, we’re looking at the game of cat and mouse playing out around blockchain technology. On one side, criminals using it to hide illicit funds. On the other, the investigators trying to find them. Adrian Morris from Grant Thornton’s Digital Asset Recovery Team is here to talk us through the strategies each side is using and who’s winning. Now the government has mandated the use of Inline Extensible Business Reporting Language or iXBRL for all accounts filed from April 1st 2028. What will it mean for preparers? Michalis Georgiou from Core Filing Limited will be here to tell us. So Adrian, thanks for coming in.
Adrian N Morris: No problem. Thank you for having me.
PL: We have this idea, don’t we, that blockchain is secure and safe from cyber criminals and fraudsters, but the Binance hack in October, I think it’s fair to say that put quite a dent in that confidence, didn’t it? Can you just remind us what happened there?
ANM: So Binance is… was the world’s biggest digital asset exchange or crypto asset exchange, and it was subject to a reasonably sophisticated hack that had all the hallmarks of a state actor. It’s been attributed to North Korea by some involved, and it ended up with Binance losing just over $6 billion worth of digital assets, which are then dispersed, laundered obviously with the intention of getting those back to the hostile state involved.
PL: So Trader Traitor was the hacking group, wasn’t it? But as you say, supposedly state-sponsored, part of a bigger hacking state-sponsored organisation called the Lazarus Group?
ANM: Yes, which operate out of North Korea and have been responsible for most of the biggest hacks in the digital asset sphere over the years.
PL: So this is not a niche industry, is it? This is global business. Do we have any sort of sense of what that business is worth now?
ANM: The digital asset sphere is in the trillions. The illicit finance arm of that is in the billions. As somebody that is an advocate for digital assets, I would always say that it’s still comparable, if not smaller than, the level of illicit finance involved in the banking and cash sectors, but it’s rare that a bank is subject to the theft of $6 billion. So it doesn’t necessarily get the same headlines.
PL: We’ve talked a lot about how AI can play into all this, but it does strike me every time we talk about this that it’s invariably about humans as well, points of access, and it was this time, wasn’t it?
ANM: Yes, absolutely. Whilst it was a sophisticated attack on Binance’s systems, at the moment the strongest theory is that it was done through social engineering and human points of failure and gaining access to hardware used by the engineers within Binance to then find backdoors into the system and then exploit Binance’s own controls and methodology on dissipating their assets.
PL: It’s interesting, isn’t it? It was job interviews?
ANM: Job interviews played a significant part in it and using, effectively, trial runs of and tests of people’s coding methodology as phishing attacks.
PL: Because we’ve talked about how LinkedIn and platforms like that, but specifically LinkedIn, play into that sort of social engineering now.
ANM: Yes. We’ve now seen that obviously with a hack of this significance, but we see that all the time in fraud cases and scams that both individuals and institutions are subject to from organised crime groups. Again, a lot of it revolves around social engineering and the digital assets are the methodology of laundering the money rather than the gold in themselves.
PL: The great thing about blockchain, of course, for bad actors, it has multiple advantages, doesn’t it? It’s anonymous and, of course, it is entirely unregulated, isn’t it?
ANM: There is regulation coming into effect, but there is no coordinated global regulation, so the US have their own regulatory frameworks under the GENIUS and CLARITY Acts. The EU operates under MiCA, and the UK’s regulatory regime is open for application at the moment and will kick in October 2027.
PL: But this is a frictionless cross-border global technology, isn’t it? So there’s some difficulties there?
ANM: Yes. Absolutely. That is the biggest thing about digital assets, that they can move almost instantaneously, and there are no real borders involved. It can move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and that jurisdictional arbitrage is something that the criminals play into.
PL: Yeah, because as I understand it, this is exactly the point about this Binance hack and the criminals themselves because the speed of moving the funds once they’ve stolen them is key, isn’t it, to success? Just explain why that is.
ANM: Effectively, especially in the state-sponsored sphere of these sort of crimes, it becomes a race between the investigators and law enforcement and the criminals themselves. The criminals are trying to move the assets as quickly as possible so that they can liquidate them and gain the direct benefit, and that’s the same really across the state-sponsored and organised crime elements. Investigators are trying to work out where they’re going to send the assets to preempt them. So when you’ve got things like stable coins, a lot of the stable coins in the industry, particularly USDT and USDC run by the Tether and Circle Foundations, are freezable on chain.
PL: Okay, so if they’re found, they can be frozen?
ANM: Effectively, yes. It’s the wallets that they’re in that can be locked down. Therefore, it’s that game of cat and mouse of trying to get the wallet’s frozen before the assets move out of them. But then you have the more, what I would term as traditional digital assets, so your Ether and your Bitcoin, which operate on the Bitcoin blockchain and the Ethereum blockchain respectively, so two completely separate chains that don’t interact, and they aren’t freezable on chain. So what you’ve got to do there is try and alert as many cooperative players within the industry, so cooperative services, that these are the proceeds of crime. So if they touch their platform, they are frozen, much in the same way as if you knew that assets had been stolen from a bank, that you would alert other banks so that if that cash ends up at their door, they can freeze it in the accounts there and don’t let the criminals withdraw it again.
PL: It’s fascinating, presumably the criminals are literally running ahead of you and laying false trails about where they’re actually putting these assets to presumably distract the people trying to find them?
ANM: Yeah, so it’s one of the key differences between how state-sponsored attacks and organised crime groups work. So when we’re dealing with state-sponsored incidents, a lot of the time it is effectively that, that game of cat and mouse, and they lay different rabbit holes because the intention is not to steal the full $6 billion, it’s to get as much of that as they can without it being frozen and stopped. There’s also a lot less of a concern on being caught hence they’re quite happy to leave hallmarks, they’re quite happy to run similar methodologies because they know that there is a significantly lower chance of any of them being brought to justice in this area. Whereas organised criminals, a lot of the time it’s a lot more about disguising what they’re doing, hiding the activity, and both law enforcement and investigators come to the party after the fact, and that’s where blockchain has a really great advantage because it produces an evidential chain. It shows where assets moved, at what time, and whilst anonymous to a degree, it does show you the wallet addresses that they moved from and to. So if you can attribute them to somebody, you can build a really strong evidential picture.
PL: Okay, so this is chain hopping? Is that what it’s called?
ANM: Yeah, so there’s elements of chain hopping involved. So it’s moving, as I mentioned, you’ve got Bitcoin and you’ve got Ethereum. There are multiple blockchains out there. There are multiple assets across them, and what you can do, especially with the stable coins, is you can move them from blockchain to blockchain, and that again creates just another hurdle for the investigators to get over when trying to build that picture of what’s happened.
PL: The upside of this if there is one, is that you can use blockchain technology to tackle crime as well. So obviously the Binance situation, that’s ongoing, isn’t it? Still trying to track down some of these funds?
ANM: Yes, so it’s still ongoing. As I mentioned, you can freeze assets. I think there’s between $2 and $3 billion of the hack has already been frozen, and what you can also do is you can monitor the assets. So a lot of the time in both the state-sponsored and criminal sphere, they will leave assets on a wallet address for a significant amount of time, and I’m talking years, where it will sit there, no one can do anything other than watch them. Then after a certain amount of time has passed, that’s when they will move the assets. What can often happen is things like the Binance hack can be used to distract. So what we saw after the Binance hack was a number of other digital asset service providers were also subject to attacks. Now, again, none of those at the moment have been attributed to state-sponsored, but if all the world’s investigative power is focused on a $6 billion hack, then stealing $50 million from a Brazilian-based exchange doesn’t get the same attention as it would if it had happened in a silo without the other having occurred beforehand.
PL: That’s really interesting, isn’t it? So you say these assets can sit in wallets for years at a time, and this is up to the moment when they cash out effectively?
ANM: Effectively, yes. Then they’ll try and move the assets. They’ll again try and obfuscate their connection to the original crime, so that will be through chain hopping or through mixing services or other elements that can occur on the blockchain. Then the ultimate goal for effectively all criminals in the digital asset space is to turn your digital assets back into fiat money.
PL: So it’s into hard currency?
ANM: Yes.
PL: And assets as well? Other assets as well, property, art, stuff like that?
ANM: Yeah. So that’s something that we have a big push for, both my time in the public sector, but also in the private sector when we’re dealing with asset tracing, is that crypto is the start of the story when you’re building that evidential piece. Just because there was a crypto scam or a crypto theft, doesn’t mean that you have to seize crypto at the end of it. A lot, especially for criminals, will convert that into high-value cars, beachfront properties, and yachts. But that doesn’t mean that you can’t seize those assets, liquidate them, and return funds to victims.
PL: Chasing all this down, you’ve alluded to it before, but it’s largely about cooperation between exchanges and global agencies and there’s a lot of players here?
ANM: Cooperation is key. As I mentioned, the fact that these assets can cross jurisdictional boundaries instantaneously means that you’ve got to have really strong relationships both between government and law enforcement internationally, and there are a number of groups set up to help combat that. So in the tax sphere, you have the J5, which is the joint chiefs of global tax enforcement, and they have specific cyber divisions that work together there. You also have operating in the UK and different jurisdictions have versions of it. So you have the JMLIT, which are public-private partnerships. Specifically in the digital asset sphere, you have the Illicit Virtual Asset Network, so IVAN, and that brings together law enforcement, private bodies, private investigative firms, and the digital asset native firms, so your crypto asset exchanges, to exchange intelligence to coordinate when things like the Binance hack happen in order to try and limit the impact that criminals can have.
PL: It’s a lot of moving parts, isn’t it?
ANM: Absolutely.
PL: And a longer game, I think, than perhaps I’d certainly understood. Because as you say, assets sit waiting to be realized for years at a time. That tells us something about the perpetrators, right? They can afford to wait. State actors, as you say their end game is potentially a mixed media approach. They want the cash, they want the disruption, whatever it might be. But just outright criminals in it for the money, they have to wait for their cash for long periods of time?
ANM: We’ve seen instances of investigations that we’ve worked on and assets have been dormant now since 2021 and have just sat in a wallet address that we are monitoring.
PL: Is there a futures market in this?
ANM: Potentially. I think everybody’s a bit worried about quantum computing hitting and whether or not some of those wallet addresses could be subject to liquidation that way. But at the moment, we’re still very much playing a waiting game and it comes down to who blinks first on the assets.
PL: In terms of numbers of players, as you said, the people behind the Binance hack, lots and lots of hacks to their name. Is there a small clutch of really significant players and then a proliferation of smaller players?
ANM: Yes, absolutely. So in the state-sponsored sphere, there are the major players here, and a lot of the organised crime groups that we come across especially that are responsible for the hacks are, whilst organised crime groups, they also have direct links to state actors.
PL: They’re working with government?
ANM: Absolutely. Then in the criminal sphere, it can range significantly from opportunists or individuals running sort of low-level frauds and scams targeting individuals. Then you also see much larger organised crime groups or more sophisticated ones who would target institutional digital asset providers or banks, but much in the same way as you see in the traditional financial sector.
PL: So where do you see this going now? It’s a perpetual game of trying to out-strategize the opposition, isn’t it from both perspectives. AI is obviously playing into it. Humans seem to still have a very significant role, though, you must have a mass of data?
ANM: Yes—
PL: But there must still be, for want of a better way of putting it, like a policeman’s gut instinct for it?
ANM: I think judgment is the biggest difference that the human brings to this on the investigative side. AI can speed up the digest and interpretation of data, but it’s then actually understanding what you’re looking at where AI doesn’t have that judgment call. Where I mentioned before about creating rabbit holes that people go down or that game of cat and mouse, it’s the seasoned and professional investigators in this sphere, it’s the ones that know exactly what they’re doing, and there are some incredible ones out there in both law enforcement globally and the private sector. Some of the blockchain analytical companies have incredible people working for them, and it’s about, as you mentioned, that gut instinct of actually I think it’s that rabbit hole that I need to go down.
PL: So do they get to know their opponents, essentially? Obviously they don’t physically get to know them, but the way they operate?
ANM: I think it becomes almost the Hollywood effect of the detective going up against his long-term adversary, and you absolutely get to know the methodologies that these different groups use. You know what to look for and that allows you, in some instances, to predict where you think assets will go or where they’ll hit next is another big one.
PL: It is a kind of new version of bounty hunters, isn’t it?
ANM: It can be, and what I think’s really important in that is much like going back to the old Westerns that we grew up watching, it’s where those bounty hunters work hand in glove with law enforcement is where you get the real impact and the real results that deter future events like the one we’ve seen against Binance.
PL: Yeah, having said that, obviously, digital asset investigation, something you do, it’s a new profession, isn’t it?
ANM: Yeah. I’m an advocate for there should be professional standards in this space and that should apply to both the private sector and law enforcement where it already does, and that just means that if you’re a victim and you’re engaging with a digital asset investigator, you know exactly what you’re getting, and when there is that cooperation with law enforcement, they know exactly who they’re working with and the standards that they operate to.
PL: Are there risks associated with being an investigator?
ANM: I think so, especially in that state-sponsored space. We’ve seen a lot of individuals that are very vocal or open about their support and the work that they’re doing against those hacks can therefore become targets themselves, and you just have to be very careful about the sort of investigations that you are willing to run and your own risk appetites.
PL: Thank you very much. Fascinating.
ANM: No problem. Thank you for having me.
PL: On to iXBRL. Michalis Georgiou is with me. Hi, thanks for coming in.
Michalis Georgiou: Hi, Philippa. Thank you for inviting me.
PL: This is new to quite a lot of us, I think. Can you just tell us exactly what it is?
MG: This is an electronic format for financial reporting, and the ‘I’ in iXBRL means that this particular format is both human readable and computer readable. So you can open the report in a browser and look at it as a normal financial report, and computers can extract each individual data point and data warehouse it for the needs of the users.
PL: So the government is mandating this from the 1st of April, 2028. Why?
MG: This is done in the context of the new Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act. The purpose of this is to improve the company register, make it more transparent, more accurate, and more reliable for making decisions based on it.
PL: So in terms of preparing accounts in iXBRL, this is specific software you need to do it?
MG: Yes. A lot of companies will be using software to do the tagging already. There’s a few different categories of solutions that I can list in a moment, and they can also outsource the conversion to manage tagging service provider. So the three main solutions of software are bolt-on tagging. So this is where you keep your existing processes of preparing financial statements, and you use a bolt-on solution to do the tagging. You can use an accounts production system, and this is where you import your trial balance, go through a wizard-like process, and that generates annual accounts, and the templates used are pre-tagged. The third solution, which is used mainly by very large corporates, is the disclosure management solution, where you have a software which pulls in the data from your various systems, and you build a specific template for your own company, and the tagging can be built in under the bonnet.
PL: What does the report actually look like? Is it visually different?
MG: It’s not different at all, but instead of your traditional PDF document, what you have is a HTML document which is why you need a browser to view it. But the report looks exactly the same as a company annual report would.
PL: Now, quite a lot of people are already doing this, aren’t they?
MG: Yes. So we had a a regulation coming in April 2011 from HMRC for corporation tax purposes. So every single company that does a corporation tax return is already doing this. They would already have software in place, or they will have a service provider in place that is helping them do this.
PL: Okay, because I was thinking for smaller firms, this would be a big step change, but it sounds from what you’re saying, not necessarily at all?
MG: No. They’re already doing it, and Companies House has also been collecting voluntary filings in iXBRL since around the same time. From Companies House own data, we know that about 75% of companies are already filing accounts digitally, and the ones that tend not to are more likely to be large companies rather than small companies.
PL: Okay. So they’re the ones that have actually got the work to do?
MG: Yes. So they are doing the tagging for HMRC, but they do it after they have done the filing to Companies House. So what will change for them is that the whole process will have to accelerate. They will need to prepare accounts a bit earlier to allow time for the tagging to happen for the nine-month Companies House deadline.
PL: But profit and loss account filing, that’s on pause. Is that right?
MG: Yes. So alongside moving to software-only filing by Companies House was also planning to require micro entities and small companies to file profit and loss accounts, and the plan was to then allow these companies to opt out from publishing their profit and loss accounts on the public register. So they would have to file it, but they wouldn’t necessarily have to have it publicly available. But a couple of weeks ago, the government has announced that they have decided to pause the requirement for profit and loss accounts for now.
PL: Do you have any sense of where that’s going?
MG: I think the idea to redact the P&L before publishing it is a solid idea. I do believe that Companies House needs to have this information for tackling economic crime, and they cannot currently use the filings from HMRC because the filings to HMRC are private filings, and HMRC has very strict rules about what they can share with other government departments. So I do think there is a need for Companies House to collect profit and loss accounts, but the mechanism needs to be created and needs to be put in place to allow for that reduction before it goes on the public register.
PL: Yeah, that brings me to the question of is HMRC, is Companies House ready for this?
MG: Companies House have given both filers and themselves plenty of time to prepare for this because they announced this in June of this year, and it’s not going live until April 2028. They already have systems in place to collect accounts, and profit and loss account filing has been paused. I guess one thing which they need to consider is that they might need to allow for bigger file sizes to be accepted at Companies House. Like I said before, the accounts that go to HMRC are private and therefore companies care less about how good the conversion looks. But when that file of very large companies becomes available on the public register suddenly what it looks like becomes far more important. So it has styling, it has images, so Companies House needs to consider whether the current file size limits they have are appropriate or whether they need to be increased.
PL: From the preparer’s point of view, obviously, as you say, April 2028, it’s not that far away, is it? It’s about, what, about a year and a half away now? Anything they should be doing right now if they’re not already using this system?
MG: They should be looking at their own internal processes, and they should be thinking about how they can do that acceleration of their accounts preparation. They need to consider how this plays in with the audit if their accounts are also being audited. If they are using third parties for the tagging, they need to be talking to their service providers about the new deadlines and about how they can help them to achieve this earlier tagging.
PL: Talking of tagging, there’s an assurance issue there?
MG: At the moment, tagging is outside the scope of audit. But the government currently has a consultation out called the Modernising Corporate Reporting Consultation. I know you have already done a podcast on that.
PL: Yes.
MG: So that’s a very broad consultation about quite a lot of different aspects of corporate reporting. But one proposal that the government is making is for audited accounts to include assurance on the tagging, but it does show how much Companies House cares about the quality of the data they will be collecting.
PL: Do you have thoughts on that?
MG: Having been an auditor myself or an auditor of XBRL, I know that there are various logistical challenges when you have a lot of clients with similar year-ends and having to do this for them. But I also know that audit does contribute to much higher quality data. So I’m hoping that auditors and other stakeholders will figure this out, and we will get that better set of XBRL data.
PL: Thank you very much.
MG: Thank you.
PL: You’ll find links relevant to both the subjects we’ve covered today in the show notes. If you’re an ICAEW accountant, you can log your listen to this podcast as CPD while you’re there. It is very quick and easy to do. Share your feedback and ideas for the podcast with the team if you’d like to by simply emailing us. Here’s the email address, podcasts@icaew.com. If you’d like to rate and review the series on your app, we would very much appreciate it. Thanks for being with us.